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The question as to whether “collective pref-
erences” of a given WTo member for values or 
principles such as environmental protection, 
food safety, cultural diversity, the public provi-
sion of education and health care, precautions 
in the field of biotechnology or welfare rights, 
could be jeopardized by the rules of the inter-
national trading system has taken a high pro-
file in europe during the last years of Pascal 
lamy’s position as eU Dg trade commissioner. 
Unachieved and criticised for its too narrow fo-
cus on alleged european concerns, the debate 
has ever since been outpaced by the difficulties 
to conclude the “Doha Development round” 
and the need widely perceived that concep-
tual issues and WTo reform options should 
be debated after, and not during, the negotia-
tion process. our view is that the difficulties 
to conclude successfully a WTo negotiation 
round highlight the very issue originally raised 
by the emergence of collective preferences in 
international trade. The document , which was 
prepared for the european Parliament (Tender 
eP/exPol/n/2006/2), wraps up the meanings of 
and rationale for collective preferences policies 
in the world trading system, and their poten-
tial implications on trade rules. 
background
est-ce que la “préférence collective” d’un 
pays membre de l’oMc pour des valeurs 
ou des principes tels que la protection de 
l’environnement, la sécurité alimentaire, la 
diversité culturelle, le financement public de 
l’éducation et des soins médicaux, les précau-
tions dans le domaine des biotechnologies ou 
les droits sociaux, pourrait être compromise 
par les règles du système de commerce in-
ternational ? cette question a été soulevée à 
de maintes reprises en europe au cours des 
dernières années du mandat de Pascal lamy 
en tant que commissaire de l’Ue en charge du 
commerce. ce débat, inachevé et critiqué pour 
s’être trop concentré sur les prétendues préoc-
cupations européennes, a depuis été dépassé 
par les difficultés à conclure le cycle de Doha 
pour le développement et l’apparente néces-
sité, que les enjeux conceptuels et les options 
de réforme de l’oMc devaient être débattus 
après, et non pendant, le processus de négo-
ciation. nous pensons que les difficultés pour 
conclure avec succès un cycle de négociation 
de l’oMc mettent en lumière la question posée 
initialement par l’émergence de préférences 
collectives dans le commerce international. cet 
article , qui a été préparé pour le Parlement eu-
ropéen (Tender eP/exPol/n/2006/2), s’attache 
également à expliciter les significations et la 
raison d’être des politiques de préférences col-
lectives dans le système de commerce interna-
tional, et leurs implications potentielles sur les 
règles du commerce.
Contexte
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abstract
In September 2004, the then european Trade 
commissioner Pascal lamy organised a con-
ference on ‘collective preferences and global 
governance: what future for the multilateral 
trading system?’. In his keynote address, Pas-
cal lamy stressed that whatever its benefits, 
international market opening also had a desta-
bilising impact on the economic and social 
fabric, and potentially on societal choices. He 
secondly argued that while efforts had been 
made to develop accompanying measures to 
deal with the effects of market opening on in-
dustry and employment, the threat to societal 
choices had so far not received proper atten-
tion. even though Pascal lamy’s diagnosis of 
the fear and the threat roused by globalisation 
has been strikingly confirmed by the back-
lash against globalisation we face today, his 
proposition stirred up controversy among eU 
trade partners and stakeholders, and criticism 
among a few academics. In the perspective of 
the inescapable reform of the WTo, our objec-
tive is to re-examine the case of the potential 
role of collective preferences in determining 
the rules of the international trading system. 
The question we focus on is whether collective 
preferences can help to provide the multilat-
eral system with better responses to societies’ 
expectations and fears concerning globalisa-
tion notably within the eU.
en septembre 2004, Pascal lamy, alors com-
missaire européenne en charge du commerce, 
organisait une conférence sur les “Préférences 
collectives et gouvernance globale: quel avenir 
pour le système de commerce multilatéral?” 
(Collective preferences and global governance: 
what future for the multilateral trading sys-
tem?). Dans son discours d’ouverture, Pascal 
lamy soulignait que quels qu’en soient les 
avantages, l’ouverture du marché international 
avait également un impact déstabilisant sur le 
tissu économique et social, et potentiellement 
sur les choix sociétaux. Il a ensuite souligné 
que si des efforts avaient été réalisés pour déve-
lopper des mesures d’accompagnement pour 
gérer les conséquences de l’ouverture du mar-
ché sur l’industrie et l’emploi, la menace sur 
les choix sociétaux ne bénéficiait pas encore de 
l’attention nécessaire. bien que le diagnostic 
de Pascal lamy au sujet de la crainte et de la 
menace engendrées par la mondialisation ait 
été confirmé de façon saisissante avec la réac-
tion brutale contre la mondialisation à laquelle 
nous faisons face aujourd’hui, ses propositions 
ont suscité des controverses au sein des par-
tenaires commerciaux et acteurs de l’Ue, ainsi 
que des critiques de la part de certains univer-
sitaires. Dans la perspective d’une inévitable 
réforme de l’oMc, nous nous attachons ici à 
ré-examiner la question du rôle potentiel des 
préférences collectives dans la détermination 
des règles du système de commerce internatio-
nal. la question sur laquelle nous mettons l’ac-
cent est de savoir si les préférences collectives 
peuvent permettre d’apporter au système mul-
tilatéral des réponses aux attentes de la société 
et aux craintes concernant la mondialisation, 
notamment au sein de l’Ue.
Résumé
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Introduction
I
n September 2004, the then europe-
an Trade commissioner Pascal lamy 
organised a conference on ‘collective 
preferences and global governance: 
what future for the multilateral trad-
ing system?’. In his keynote address, 
Pascal lamy stressed that whatever 
its benefits, international market opening also 
had a destabilising impact on the economic and 
social fabric, and potentially on societal choic-
es. He secondly argued that while efforts had 
been made to develop accompanying measures 
to deal with the effects of market opening on 
industry and employment, the threat to societal 
choices had so far not received proper atten-
tion. The challenge, in his view, was to design 
an open trading system that everyone accepts 
and that safeguards legitimate social choices.
europe’s collective preferences were identi-
fied as including values like multilateralism, 
environmental protection, food safety, cultural 
diversity, the public provision of education and 
health care, precautions in the field of biotech-
nology and welfare rights. eroding such values 
while further liberalising trade would appear 
as a loss for the eU, according to Pascal lamy. 
Mr lamy proposed a new temporary safeguard 
clause to be added to the WTo agreements, 
potentially accompanied by a compensation 
mechanism aimed at those who would suffer 
from these safeguards.
even though Pascal lamy’s diagnosis of the 
fear and the threat roused by globalisation 
has been strikingly confirmed by the back-
lash against globalisation we face today, his 
proposition stirred up controversy among eU 
trade partners and stakeholders, and criticism 
among a few academics. Still, his nomination 
at the WTo as Director general, and the con-
siderable difficulties finalising the Doha round 
of trade negotiations, somehow left the debate 
on collective preferences unfinished. In the 
perspective of the inescapable reform of the 
WTo, the objective of this article is to re-ex-
amine the case of the potential role of collec-
tive preferences in determining the rules of the 
international trading system. The question we 
focus on is whether collective preferences can 
help to provide the multilateral system with 
better responses to societies’ expectations and 
fears concerning globalisation notably within 
the eU.
Trade can be a means for emerging countries 
to raise per capita income, which would in turn 
tend to raise social demand for non-traded 
goods such as education, health, environment 
and better social conditions. Thus, trade is not 
necessarily an obstacle to the fulfilment of the 
non-trade aspects of collective preferences. 
nevertheless, it seems that domestic public 
choices are evolving more rapidly in compli-
ance with international trade rules than in 
compliance with the non-trade rules of globali-
sation. Therefore, one may wonder whether 
the global legal system is able to ensure both 
the fulfilment of collective preferences for 
non-tradable goods and the provision of trad-
able goods. 
We start by evaluating the current state of 
the debate on collective preferences. We then 
provide a definition of collective preferences 
based on the economic definition of preferenc-
es and social choice. as a next step we explore 
the relevant WTo agreements and dispute cas-
es to draw their main implications in terms of 
collective preferences. The next part suggests 
The potential role for collective preferences in determining the rules of the international trading system
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possible methodological elements to assess 
european preferences in a selected number of 
issues. Key policy implications are outlined be-
fore conclusion.
The state of the debate on 
collective preferences 
The core of the debate: common 
goals and heterogeneous 
collective preferences
The WTo expanded the gaTT mandate by 
covering new sectors such as services and intel-
lectual property rights, and including domestic 
policies like farm policies. Such an expansion 
towards ‘reserved domains’ of sovereignty obvi-
ously generated friction and dissension among 
populations, ngos and politicians. The ngo 
campaign against the gaTS, on the grounds 
that it could disrupt the social 
contract on particular aspects 
of public services provision, 
united resistance to the WTo 
in the mid 1990s. 
as long as only tariffs were 
concerned by negotiations, 
trade increase would occur at 
the expense of specific exist-
ing activities, but only political preferences1 
for these sectors were challenged. citizens 
outside these sectors would not be affected by 
trade increase as long as governments were 
allowed to mitigate economic changes with 
unconstrained domestic policies. now that ne-
gotiations deal with domestic policies, public 
choices regarding domestic issues are being 
made under the potential constraint of inter-
national trade rules. The fact that efficient pub-
lic policy can be implemented in a non-trade 
distortive way whatever the policy goal (hence 
whatever the collective preferences) is a key is-
sue for all negotiation sectors. but this overall 
requirement that public choices should not al-
ter trade may be at the root of a growing feel-
ing among citizens that they are losing control 
over their political destiny. 
This feeling is not equally perceived 
throughout the world. In some countries, citi-
zens do not necessarily have the feeling that 
governments are mandated to serve their col-
lective preferences, or that governments actu-
ally serve these preferences in a reliable and 
efficient way. In such contexts, the perception 
1 Political economics define collective preferences as the diffe-
rentiated weights that a government attributes to social groups 
when maximising a social utility function. 
of the WTo threat to public choice is limited 
because public choice itself does not neces-
sarily guarantee the fulfilment of collective 
preferences.  Furthermore, countries with low 
environmental or social standards face trading 
partners with higher standards, and, all else be-
ing equal, higher production costs. For them, 
the trade increase would not threaten these 
non-trade aspects of their collective preferenc-
es. Finally countries from the old world with 
long-standing traditions and cultural heritage 
may adopt the view that their identities and 
values have contributed to the sustainability of 
their society, and are reluctant to let them be 
challenged by the global trading system. 
nevertheless, many contries are facing poten-
tial contradictions between their willingness to 
cooperate to the multilateral coordination and 
their will to defend their citizens’ collective 
preferences. For instance emerging countries 
often have lower preferences for environmen-
tal concerns than oecD countries and see the 
perspective of co2 limitations as a ‘threat’ to 
their priorities. This threat will probably not 
be expressed in trade negotiations, but in mul-
tilateral environmental agreements. conceptu-
ally, the need for emerging countries to comply 
with environmental cooperation in spite of the 
low weight of environmental concerns in their 
collective preferences is comparable to the 
need for oecD countries to comply with trade 
rules in spite of relatively lower importance 
given to the increased availability of merchan-
dise in their collective preferences.  
Therefore, heterogeneity in collective prefer-
ences in a context of global cooperation is a 
global concern. 
Is there a European specificity 
on collective preferences? 
even though his conception of collective 
preferences is rather universal – ‘collective 
preferences are the end result of choices made 
by human communities that apply to the com-
munity as a whole’ – lamy’s diagnosis mainly 
rests on european examples.
The eU perception of the issue indeed shows 
some specificity. environmental and social 
standards and policies in europe are higher 
than in most other countries, reflecting the 
average income and subjective values of eu-
ropeans. In comparison with most countries, 
expectations concerning global environmental 
and social goals in europe are probably higher 
than those concerning an increase in the avail-
ability of commodities. This may explain why 
trade rules may be seen in europe as a poten-
collective preferences 
are the end result of 
choices made by human 
communities that apply 
to the community 
as a whole. 
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tial source of constraints on their collective 
preferences, whereas non-trade negotiations 
are mostly viewed as an opportunity (to meet 
their preferences for non-trade goals).
The role given by european citizens to their 
public institutions in mitigating the social ef-
fects of job losses is also important in the 
european perception of international trade. 
recent debates on globalisation confirm that 
the perception of a threat in several european 
countries is real and that policy makers are 
somewhat shorter of political support for glo-
balisation than one might have guessed when 
the WTo round was launched. Hence, in a sur-
vey on ‘Trade victims’, The Economist contends 
that ‘rather than affecting entire industries, or 
whole factories, global competition will affect 
individual jobs – skilled as much as unskilled. 
Such a shift helps explain the popular nervous-
ness about globalisation. Many more workers 
are worried that their jobs will be at risk’ (The 
Economist, 20-26 January 2007, p31). The fear 
of lining up with the next WTo round’s losers 
pervades among the population.
Trade measures are sometimes considered as 
the last resort protection for those sectors that 
could not compete in a global economy. The 
budget expenditures required to compensate 
losers could increase in the short term in case 
of imposed liberalisation. 
‘In advanced countries with social welfare 
programs in place, it should be primarily 
spending on social security and welfare that is 
correlated with exposure to external risk (…)’ 
(rodrik, 1998, p1019).
but increased public expenditure is not an 
auspicious development in a global economy 
either. Since increased public expenditures can 
have a negative effect on potential investments 
and productivity, trade liberalisation is consid-
ered by many as the end of the welfare states 
in europe (box 1).
This is probably part of the reason why wel-
fare states in europe perceive the expansion of 
the WTo rules as a threat to the policy space of 
its different Member States. assuming that the 
champions of globalisation are equally sensi-
tive to the losers, expanding Trade adjustment 
assistance (Taa), as US Democrats did in win-
ter 2006, is politically easier than hastening the 
process of reforming the welfare states. It may 
justify the eU’s need to postpone reforms un-
der the umbrella of trade protection. The need 
for temporary safeguards is understandable in 
this respect. 
A summary of potential and 
actual controversies raised 
by collective preferences
The political debate on the potential value 
of referring to collective preferences in trade 
negotiations is still at an early stage, and the 
scientific contribution to this debate as such is 
also limited. 
nevertheless, the question raised relates to 
existing debate on the role of the WTo in glo-
bal governance. UncTaD uses the concept of 
‘policy space’ to designate the decision margin 
countries should maintain in order to pursue 
social or economic goals, and highlights the 
risk of the erosion of this policy space by in-
ternational trade. For UncTaD, the concept of 
policy space is particularly relevant for South-
ern countries, whose development may require 
specific protection. UncTaD highlights the 
potential constraints of trade rules and con-
ditionality linked to loans or aid in particular. 
In this sense, the question of whether or not 
specific needs justify trade-affecting measures 
relates to that of whether or not specific collec-
tive preferences justify trade-affecting meas-
Following garrett (1998, 2001), we can distinguish two basic positions on the relationship 
between the dynamics of public 
expenditure and globalisation. The 
“efficiency” hypothesis highlights 
competitiveness pressures and exit 
threats by mobile asset holders. The 
‘compensation’ hypothesis, in con-
trast, emphasises the domestic dis-
locations generated by globalisation 
and the incentives for government 
intervention in the economy that 
these generate.
The efficiency hypothesis
The fundamental tenet of the 
efficiency hypothesis is that gov-
ernment spending beyond minimal 
market-friendly measures, such as 
defence, securing property rights 
and other fundamental public 
goods, reduces the competitiveness 
of national producers in interna-
tional goods and services markets. 
Income transfer programmes and 
social services distort labour mar-
kets and bias investment decisions. 
Moreover, government spending 
must be funded either by borrow-
ing or by increasing taxes. Income 
and consumption taxes reduce the 
profitability of work and invest-
ment in the country. borrowing 
results in higher real interest rates, 
depressing investment. If this also 
leads to an appreciation in the real 
exchange rate, the competitiveness 
of national producers is reduced. 
Therefore, the efficiency hypothesis 
supports the idea that globalisation 
creates incentives for governments 
to reduce public expenses. 
The compensation hypothesis
Short-term expansion of the scope 
of markets is likely to increase citi-
zen support for government spend-
ing to compensate for increased 
inequality and economic insecurity. 
These are two strong political incen-
tives to increase public expenses in 
response to globalisation that may 
offset the competitiveness pressures 
generated by market integration.
Source: garrett (1998), garrett (2001) 
The political economy of globalisation 
and job insurance
Box 1
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ures. UneP has also indirectly provided useful 
contributions to the debate, notably through 
its analysis of the relationships between mul-
tilateral environmental agreements and trade 
rules. UneP urges for better cooperation be-
tween the WTo and the secretariats of multi-
lateral environmental agreements (Meas) to 
improve coherence between multilateral in-
stitutions and to strengthen the enforcement 
of Meas. To some extent, UneP’s works can 
also be interpreted as an effort to better inte-
grate collective preferences in multilateral in-
stitutions. In the same sense, the Ilo aims at 
ensuring the fulfilment of globally accepted 
minimal labour rights in a context of increased 
competition. The Ilo’s works also sustains the 
debate on the need for balancing the collective 
preferences for social needs 
and economic growth. 
This note uses these works 
to address the question of 
whether collective prefer-
ences can be useful for the 
trading system, keeping as 
close as possible to the orien-
tation given by Pascal lamy. 
This orientation is a new one 
because it is non-thematic 
and because its purpose is to 
improve trade rules. accord-
ing to Pascal lamy’s intuition, fears that social 
choices might be called into question by an 
all-powerful WTo were behind the rejection 
of globalisation. His main message to trade ne-
gotiators and policy makers was that whether 
or not these fears were justified, they should 
be met with a credible response (lamy, 2004, 
p1). even if the debate on collective preferenc-
es has not yet spread very far, this orientation 
seems promising in the long run. The aim of 
improving trade rules and the non-thematic 
orientation is likely to attract the interest of 
negotiators because each country has collec-
tive preferences to fulfil. The same does not 
hold for thematic discussions. 
Pascal lamy initiated the debate on collec-
tive preferences and the global governance of 
the world trading system as he approached the 
end of his term as european commissioner 
for Trade. a non-paper on the same issue was 
drafted in november 2003 and first released 
by the commission on 18 February 2004. The 
non-paper’s first objective was to ‘justify differ-
ent/higher and restrictive standards vis-à-vis 
trade partners’ (ec non-Paper, 2004, p1). Its 
second aim was to react to information leak-
age after the Financial Times published an arti-
cle on 6 February indicating that Dg Trade had 
prepared a document on the issue. The official 
birth of the project was hence controversial in 
itself. Its original content proved controversial 
too.2 When this paper was completed and pre-
sented in brussels on 15 September 2004, it did 
not receive the imprimatur of the commission. 
Some of the most important possible reasons 
include the uncertainty on the precise mean-
ing and implications of the concept, as well as 
fears of misinterpretation by trading countries. 
Since then, Dg trade has not continued explicit 
work on collective preferences, partly because 
of these uncertainties and partly because of the 
priorities of the WTo agenda.
a follow-up to the conference took place 
within the framework of the Dg Trade civil 
Society Dialogue in brussels in october 2004. 
Two months later in Paris, the French think 
tank ‘en Temps réel’ convened a meeting on 
Pascal lamy and his proposition. a publica-
tion of Pascal lamy’s paper, as well as char-
novitz and Wyplosz’s comments made during 
the December meeting in Paris, were published 
in 2005 (en Temps réel, 2005). a synthesis of 
the reactions formulated during these three 
events highlights the three main objections as 
follows:
Objection 1: are collective preferences really 
an issue in the world trading system? Which 
issues could be better addressed through the 
concept of collective preferences than through 
the existing concepts of externalities, social 
choices and public goods? The novelty of the 
concept in the WTo framework and the spe-
cific problems addressed remained unclear. 
very few academics endorsed Pascal lamy’s 
diagnosis, and when they did, they took their 
distance from lamy’s proposals. The most no-
table example is Steve charnovitz (2005), who 
stated that ‘The problem lamy addresses is 
real. countries will often adopt different pub-
lic policies, and, as lamy says, trade becomes 
a “natural point of intersection for different 
systems of collective preferences”. clashing or 
distinctive collective preferences between gov-
ernments have led to trade disputes (e.g. hor-
mones), and will assuredly do so in the future. 
When WTo rules inhibit domestic autonomy, 
that can undermine public support for the 
trading system.’ (charnovitz, 2005). 
charnovitz mentioned that concerns similar 
2 guy de Jonquieres (2004), ‘lamy Studies radical Idea for 
Imports veto’, Financial Times, 6 February 2004, p9; (edito-
rial), ‘lamy’s big Idea’, Financial Times, 10 February 2004, p14; 
‘eU “collective Preferences” concept rings alarm bells in 
Washington’, Food Chemical News, 12 april 2004, p 25; ‘UnIce 
Slams lamy over “collective Preferences”, European Report, 1 
May 2004.
The political debate on 
the potential value of 
referring to collective 
preferences in trade 
negotiations is still at 
an early stage, and the 
scientific contribution 
to this debate as such is 
also limited. 
Definitions and aggregation issues
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to those raised by lamy had been formulated 
before lamy wrote his essay. Ironically, some 
earlier proposals were even made by some crit-
ics of lamy’s initiative, including bronckers 
(2004) and bhagwati (2004). others dated back 
to a few years before, such as rodrik (1996) 
and Perdikis, Kerr and Hobbs (2001), without 
lamy’s mentioning them. according to char-
novitz’s analysis, Pascal lamy’s thoughtful di-
agnosis seems apposite, at least in academic 
terms. 
To clarify this, it seems worthwhile going 
back to the economic meaning of collective 
preferences to understand its potential rel-
evance in a multilateral trad-
ing context.
Objection 2: The concept 
and practical implications 
of collective preferences are 
unclear, including the com-
pensation mechanism. What 
is the current legal status of 
collective preferences un-
der WTo rules? What status 
changes seem to be needed? 
We investigate both ques-
tions, examining current rules, and possible 
future changes to these rules.
Objection 3: Taking into account collective 
preferences could reinforce asymmetry in the 
world trading system (in favour of rich coun-
tries) and trigger further protectionist policies. 
collective preferences that would simply pro-
tect domestic producers from international 
competition would not be recognised as a sus-
tainable policy at the WTo. The problem is that 
only governments know their own motives for 
implementing a policy, which may arise from 
both protectionist reasons and public interest. 
We investigate this debate by analysing actual 
policies in different countries in order to ob-
tain some objective indicators of preferences.
Definitions  
and aggregation issues
Individual preferences are the implicit hier-
archies established by each citizen for differ-
ent possible states of the world. economically, 
these states of the world are characterised in 
particular by the combinations of each private 
good purchased by this person and the level of 
each public good that affects his welfare.3
In simple terms, preferences reflect people’s 
3 Welfare is an ordinal measurement of satisfaction (or utility), 
depending on these goods and services.  
priorities regarding the way they allocate their 
resources across different uses, including the 
quality of private goods, their social expecta-
tions, and more generally the combination of 
public goods they expect, including the envi-
ronment, public infrastructure and transpor-
tation, health care, education, military safety, 
civil safety, and local environmental charac-
teristics. all these expectations and purchases 
are subject to individual budget constraints 
that limit their private and social demands for 
these goods and services, and to subjective fac-
tors such as culture, information, living condi-
tions and tastes.
an extended understanding may include po-
litical preferences, in other words the political 
support they agree to bring to each activity sec-
tor or social group. 
another extended understanding includes 
people’s expectations regarding the charac-
teristics of the world as a whole, in particular 
social and environmental conditions in other 
countries. These are referred to as outwardly-
directed preferences (charnovitz, 2005). 
collective preferences take the idea of in-
dividual preferences to the community level. 
Thus, collective preferences are the relative 
hierarchy that the majority of a community 
establishes between all possible states of the 
world. In the context of the world trading sys-
tem, collective preferences are the scheme of 
priorities between different possible uses of 
resources that societies of different scales re-
flect in their public choices in order to improve 
their living conditions.
For non-markets goods and values, public in-
tervention is generally needed to fulfil social 
expectations. The challenge for the govern-
ment before delivering on public goods and 
protecting social values is to establish its own 
perception of the preferences of the society as 
a whole – the collective preferences of the com-
munity to which it is accountable. Democratic 
governments adjust to what they think are col-
lective preferences in a given period through 
a complex decision making process (negotia-
tions, surveys, elections, parliamentary initia-
tives, etc.).
Three implications must be underlined. 
Firstly, the central government decision-mak-
ing process can be interpreted as a means of ar-
bitrating between individual preferences. This 
means that the current provision of public 
goods (through public policies) and the satis-
faction of social values in a given society do not 
directly account for the collective preferences 
of the country, but merely reflect a particular 
choice in a given political context, that will 
It seems worthwhile 
going back to the 
economic meaning of 
collective preferences 
to understand its 
potential relevance in 
a multilateral trading 
context.
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be submitted to citizens’ evaluation (through 
voting, polling, trade-union initiatives, etc.). 
collective preferences are not necessarily im-
paired by policy reforms, and they cannot jus-
tify all current policies in a given country. 
Secondly, multilateral trade negotiations do 
enter the above-mentioned political process 
of democratic governments, helping willing 
governments to account for national collective 
preferences during the preparatory process of 
trade negotiations, or in their 
wake. For instance, collective 
preferences at the world level 
for fair access to generic med-
icines would not have been 
revealed without the TrIPS 
negotiations and backlash.
Thirdly, trade negotiations 
may improve some aspects 
of people’s preferences, espe-
cially the availability of com-
modities, and neglect other 
aspects such as resource 
conservation and equity, etc. 
Therefore, trade influence on domestic policies 
does not mean that collective preferences are 
always threatened by trade (since trade may 
contribute to them); it means that the various 
elements of their preferences are not equally 
taken into account at the world level. at the na-
tional level, this leads to unequal pressure on 
policy reforms in favour of trade improvement 
over improvements in non-trade concerns.  
The WTO legal framework 
and collective preferences
The dilemma of the multilateral governance 
system is to achieve common goals, which re-
quires constraints and new directions for na-
tional policies, without limiting the possibility 
for national collective specificities. The goals 
of global governance themselves are supposed 
to improve the fulfilment of certain aspects 
of collective preferences that nations share at 
the world level. These include the freer-trade 
of commodities (WTo), the protection of bio-
diversity (cbD), and the prevention of climate 
change (Kyoto Protocol), etc.  
The fact that multilateral disciplines impose 
changes in domestic policies does not necessar-
ily imply that collective preferences are threat-
ened, provided the trade negotiators have a 
sufficiently broad perception of their country’s 
collective preferences. nevertheless, the differ-
ent aspects of collective preferences are une-
venly represented in each negotiation because 
of the negotiation path itself, and this can cre-
ate imbalance among the different elements of 
collective preferences for some countries. 
The relevant WTO agreements to deal 
with collective preference issues
The WTo provides rules whereby non-trade 
elements of national collective preferences 
can be preserved through non-trade concerns, 
or “legitimate domestic measures”. Following 
charnovitz, we identify four distinct mecha-
nisms for this:
National treatment
national treatment requires that countries 
offer foreign providers equivalent conditions 
to those offered to national providers. Theo-
retically, this leaves room for countries to set 
domestic policies to promote their collective 
preferences, as long as these apply without dis-
crimination against like products.
For instance, in the SPS agreement, national 
treatment enables the protection of prefer-
ences for high sanitary standards4, provided it 
can be proved that the measure is justified on 
internationally recognised grounds. as shown 
in the beef hormone case, this does not allow 
countries to differentiate products if the neces-
sity of this differentiation is not established on 
internationally recognised bases. In this case, 
states cannot regulate trade to reach their pub-
lic objectives. For instance, individual citizens 
must reflect their private preferences for pro-
duction methods – assuming their information 
enables them to do so – through their purchas-
es. economic theory can support this approach 
as long as the consumer is the only person 
involved in the purchase, but not when pub-
lic aspects are involved in this consumption. 
For instance, the risk of viruses spreading after 
importation, if not scientifically established, 
cannot be prevented through trade regulation, 
which may be an obstacle to policy efficiency.
Furthermore, national treatment opposes up-
stream trade regulation for attributes such as: 
- preferences for higher labour standards in 
trading partner countries;
- political preferences (to support and protect 
social groups that could be threatened by 
lower-cost imports);
- animal welfare (if not visible in the product’s 
final characteristics).
Whether or not linkages between trade and 
such concerns are legitimate is a highly contro-
4 Higher than internationally-recognised standards, like those 
registered at the codex alimentarius.
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versial issue that cannot be solved in a straight-
forward way. at this stage, it must be recalled 
that the spirit of the WTo national treatment 
principle is to prevent such linkages, in other 
words to prevent countries from using trade 
regulation in the name of these concerns. 
but it is important to note that many sectors 
are not covered, or not fully covered, by the 
national treatment principle. Public services 
are not covered by this principle since they are 
partly or fully provided through the national 
public budget. existing tariffs are a way to en-
sure the protection of political preferences in 
favour of national providers. agricultural poli-
cies still ensure advantages for national farm-
ers, etc. 
Existing safeguards 
In principle, temporary safeguards are not 
meant to promote collective preferences, but 
only to respond to a short-term necessity to 
cope with exceptional world trade circumstanc-
es. These safeguards consist in temporarily re-
stricting imports (theoretically for four years at 
the most, exceptionally for eight years), if a do-
mestic industry is threatened by a surge in im-
ports. In theory, safeguard measures cannot be 
targeted at imports from a particular country. 
When a country restricts imports in order to 
safeguard its domestic producers, the export-
ing countries can seek compensation through 
consultations.
Such safeguards are often considered ambig-
uous because they potentially contain a protec-
tionist effect in favour of targeted sectors. 
For all these reasons, existing provisions for 
safeguards should perhaps not be considered 
as a tool adapted to collective preferences. 
General exceptions 
The general exceptions allow trade regula-
tion for a limited set of motives and under con-
dition of non-discrimination and unintended 
protection. In principle, temporary safeguards 
are not meant to promote collective prefer-
ences, but only to respond to a short-term ne-
cessity to cope with exceptional world trade 
circumstances.
gaTT article XX lists a number of non-
trade concerns for which trade measures are 
allowed, provided the trade distortion they 
generate is minimal. analysis of a number of 
conflicts shows how these provisions can be 
used effectively in defence of collective prefer-
ences for non-trade concerns, along with their 
limitations. 
as long as the need for trade measures to 
meet non-trade objectives can bee assessed, 
and as long as this assessment is validated 
by international criteria, there is potential for 
countries to use this article. However, in many 
cases, the appreciation of the legitimacy of 
trade measures is critical. a typical case for 
subjective non-trade concerns is the provision 
on the public moral. The perception of poli-
cies that are necessary for moral reasons is of 
course very subjective, and difficult to assess in 
a multilaterally accepted manner. even the pro-
vision on human, animal and plant health is no 
guarantee for countries with high standards. 
The appreciation of health risks themselves is 
very different in rich and poor countries for an 
equivalent level of physiological impact.
gaTT article Iv on cinematograph films pro-
vides another example of a possibility for coun-
tries to use quantitative import restrictions to 
implement their cultural preferences.
The gaTS agreement is another example 
of the WTo leaving room for the expression 
of collective preferences, partly because this 
is a new and complex issue to agree upon, 
and partly because many governments are 
very sensitive to their country’s conception of 
public services. Thanks to the positive list ap-
proach, countries are allowed to choose the sec-
tors they agree to open to foreign competition, 
with all other services sectors being exempt 
from multilateral liberalisation. For now, the 
collective preference for the public provision 
of any service can be preserved. In turns, the 
negotiation incentives might, however, lead 
countries to put these services on the table. If 
societies cannot chose the economic role they 
wish their government to play in services pro-
vision, the sense of a loss of sovereignty might 
be much stronger than it is now for commod-
ity trade. 
The Dispute Settlement Body ruling
The Dispute Settlement body has the power 
to evaluate whether domestic policies are nec-
essary to implement collective preferences 
(non-trade concerns). ‘Whether WTo rules 
actually do infringe legitimate domestic meas-
ures will depend on how they are adjudicated 
by WTo panels and the appellate body’.
Possible infringements lie in the many ways 
WTo rules can potentially prevent non-protec-
tionist domestic measures designed to achieve 
national preferences. charnovitz gives a list of 
policies that could be challenged by the corre-
sponding WTo agreements. 
The gaTT laws themselves give few indica-
tions as to the legitimate non-trade concerns 
that could justify specific measures. Precedents 
on these concerns and appropriate policies are 
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very recent and in the decades to come will 
reveal the boundaries between legitimate and 
illegitimate policies for non-trade concerns.
Examining DSB cases
The US-EU beef hormone dispute
The eU-US beef hormone dispute can be 
interpreted as an example where the eU ban 
on US beef was considered an unnecessary 
policy to defend eU collective preferences ac-
cording to the first ruling.5 Since the eU as-
sessment of the policy rationale based on the 
sanitary risk was considered unconvincing, 
it means that the alleged eU preference for 
hormone-free beef was not considered a good 
reason for trade restriction. The trade retalia-
tion imposed by the US can be interpreted as 
the ‘price to pay’ (for the loss of market share 
in the US) by the eU to maintain its policy for 
alleged european preferences. This indicates 
that countries can still defend their collective 
preferences in the absence of proven risk, but 
must suffer retaliation.
but after improvement of the eU assess-
ment of the rationality of the import ban, the 
US should have ended its retaliation, which it 
did not. This indicates that the assessment of 
the need for the trade restricting policy may 
be more flexible than one might think.
The main insight we draw out of this case 
is that the content of the reality of the alleged 
collective preferences counts less than the ef-
forts to use internationally recognised meth-
ods to justify the policy in favour of these 
preferences. The financial means and technol-
ogy required to defend collective preferences 
in this case may be a barrier to their promo-
tion. 
Furthermore, we can infer from this dispute 
that no trade regulation of production meth-
ods would be allowed if it were not justified 
by risks, but rather by tastes or beliefs.
The shrimp/turtle dispute
In very simple terms, we can interpret this 
case as a conflict between the US and a group 
of shrimp-exporting asian countries, the 
US having relatively higher preferences for 
the conservation of endangered turtles than 
asian countries.
after an improvement of the US assessment 
5 It is of course questionable whether the eU communities effec-
tively have higher preferences for hormone-free beef than the 
US, or if the eU simply needs new protectionist devices. Howe-
ver, our aim is not to judge countries’ real motivations, but the 
effects of the WTo practices if countries indeed have collective 
preferences for such concerns as hormones in beef.
of the need to maintain its ban on shrimp im-
ports from a number of asian countries, its 
alleged preferences were recognised as legiti-
mate by the appellate body. The appellate 
body’s report explicitly refers to cITeS (con-
vention on International Trade in endangered 
Species) as an argument to legitimate the im-
port ban under gaTT article XX on general 
exceptions to trade rules. below is an abstract 
of the appellate body’s report.
‘all species of sea turtles have been included 
in appendix I of the convention on Interna-
tional Trade in endangered Species of Wild 
Flora and Fauna (the “cITeS”) since 1975 (…) 
In paragraph 7.58 of the Panel report, the 
Panel noted:  “The endangered nature of the 
species of sea turtles mentioned in [cITeS] 
annex I as well as the need to protect them 
are consequently not contested by the parties 
to the dispute.’
This means that international conventions 
can also potentially be used as an argument 
for trade measures to protect collective pref-
erences. It must be noted that although the 
WTo could have compelled the US to remove 
its ban in the case of a ruling in favour of 
the asian countries, it cannot compel these 
countries to modify their fishing techniques 
in such a way as to meet conservation objec-
tives. Interestingly, it also illustrates that the 
theoretical absence of linkages between trade 
and non-trade agreements tends to be raised 
in the WTo framework. 
Finally as in the previous case, the purpose 
of the policy is not so much at the core of the 
ruling as the assessment method used to es-
tablish the necessity of the policy.
Antigua and Barbuda - US Gambling 
dispute
after antigua and barbuda challenged the 
United States’ ban on cross-border Internet 
gambling and betting on moral grounds, the 
US public moral defence argument was ac-
knowledged as a legitimate objective of the 
US measures at stake. The conflict was not 
solved by resorting to a reference as to what 
the appropriate “moral level” should be. but 
the United States had failed to demonstrate 
that its prohibitions applied to both foreign 
and domestic service suppliers in a manner 
that did not constitute ‘arbitrary and unjusti-
fiable discrimination’, as required by the cha-
peau of article XIv on public moral defence 
exceptions. It would otherwise have won its 
case and made its own preferences for moral 
defences override antigua’s preferences for 
increased market access.
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again, even though the WTo does not chal-
lenge the content of collective preferences, 
the possibility of showing the necessity of a 
trade measure – which depends on this con-
tent – is the key element of the ruling.
Some insights from the cases examined
a generic conclusion we can draw from 
these precedents is that panels do not judge 
the substance of collective preferences, but the 
way in which countries assess their need for 
a specific measure. The improvement of the 
assessment method has even resulted in the 
panel making changes to its decisions (as with 
the shrimp and hormone cases). In both cases, 
this improved assessment 
has turned in favour of non-
trade concerns. 
Still, the condition that a 
measure must be necessary 
if it is to be allowed raises 
questions. according to ba-
sic principles of the public 
economy, a policy does not 
need to be necessary to be 
fruitful. Decision makers’ intuitions or beliefs 
are probably the most common way of imple-
menting policies in favour of a community. 
existing policies are hardly ever ‘necessary’ 
to achieve a given purpose. alternative ways 
to achieve this goal always exist. It may be ar-
gued, for instance, that better labelling is more 
trade-friendly than import regulation, and still 
makes it possible for each consumer to chose 
whether they prefer higher quality purchases 
(with fewer sanitary risks) or whether they 
prefer cheaper purchases. In this sense, trade 
restrictions are not necessary to achieve a level 
of safety corresponding to each person’s in-
come and risk perception. but as long as the 
information is never complete and as long as 
the sanitary effects may not be limited to the 
consumer, trade regulation, while not strictly 
necessary, may be more efficient than trade-
friendly policies to achieve the same objective 
of ensuring a satisfactory level of protection 
against sanitary risks. WTo precedents there-
fore tend to increase the cost of legitimating 
social choices in favour of public goods.
nevertheless, these types of trade-related 
assessments of collective preferences provide 
very interesting input for the implementation 
of non-trade conventions. The US assessment 
of endangered turtles and the eU assessment 
of the hormone case can both contribute to im-
proving explicit links between trade and non-
trade conventions, and can feed the discussion 
in alternative fora. 
Trade law and non-trade 
law relationships
according to our analysis, collective prefer-
ences encompass non-trade values and trade 
values, the relative weight of each differing 
across countries. The WTo rules in general are 
likely to increase demand for private goods, 
which are important elements of collective 
preferences, and this should not be neglected. 
Trade in this respect contributes to ensuring 
lower prices and increasing export earnings. 
These two aspects can improve people’s living 
conditions and also increase the income share 
available for public goods. Health care, educa-
tion and labour standards remain closely cor-
related with national income.
Still, as we have seen, trade dispute settle-
ments enforce trade rules, and trade rules alone 
(with few exceptions). This progressively leads 
national short-term arbitration to favour trade-
friendly policies at the expense of socially- or 
environmentally-friendly policies. The Kyoto 
Protocol is an example of a non-trade conven-
tion that is not widely implemented because of 
a weak application mechanism in relation to its 
ambitions. Thus, national arbitration between 
the willingness to regulate polluting industries 
– and meet Kyoto objectives – and the willing-
ness to export typically turns in favour of the 
latter. The same is true of the convention on 
biodiversity. Therefore, in simple terms, pri-
vate elements of collective preferences tend to 
be more easily provided than public elements. 
The whole governance system seems unbal-
anced and countries with higher collective 
preferences for public goods and non-trade 
concerns are probably more threatened than 
others by this unbalanced governance.   
Towards an assessment of 
‘European collective preferences’ 
Policies and preferences are not synony-
mous because policies are often inherited 
from a world in which interaction between 
countries was not as stringent as today, and 
where governments tended to satisfy people’s 
expectations from the national perspective 
alone. Thus, policies probably ignore some of 
the potential value of coordination in terms of 
improving the fulfilment of collective prefer-
ences. Furthermore, policies arise from a com-
plex interplay of lobbies and one can imagine 
that the welfare of silent groups is probably 
underestimated in existing policies.  
nevertheless because of selective democratic 
according to our 
analysis, collective 
preferences encompass 
non-trade values and 
trade values, the relative 
weight of each differing 
across countries. 
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pressure on proposed policies, we still consider 
that existing policies are a reasonable starting 
point from which to draw elements of collec-
tive preferences. 
our aim is of course not to describe the com-
plete collective preferences scheme, which 
would be impossible. Preferences being com-
parisons between observed and non-observed 
states of the world, one can at the most analyse 
the prevailing arbitration between different 
allocations of resources in the existing state of 
the world in the country under consideration.6 
These arbitrations are supposed to account for 
the social demand for each non-market good 
in question (the other parameters of the state 
of the world being taken as granted). 
This illustrates the relative value attributed 
by the society to different non-market goods in 
comparison with the value attributed by other 
societies to these non-market goods given the 
existing level of these non-market goods ac-
tually observed in these countries, and given 
all other factors that may influence public 
choices. However, where possible, we do take 
account of the revenue effect on choices in or-
der to avoid attributing to preferences what is 
actually due to income. 
Labour rights
legislation on labour rights can be used to 
reflect the arbitration between people’s de-
mand for higher income and their demand 
for non-consumption attributes like leisure. 
among these labour rights, the legislation on 
working time could be compared between 
countries, provided parameters like legal holi-
days are considered. To avoid such a complex 
comparison, we compare the effective yearly 
working time – instead of the legislation – that 
gives another indicator of the preferred arbi-
tration between leisure and income. linear re-
gression suggests that the eU has a relatively 
higher preference for leisure over income or 
consumption goods than most other coun-
tries. This preference for leisure over income 
is negatively correlated with the income level, 
but we can also identify regional effects. In 
particular the average yearly working time is 
very homogenous among european countries 
6 Describing all european preferences would imply being able to 
answer questions such as: what would be the average european 
willingness to pay to increase national education services by 
one unit (say one teacher), if average gDP per capita were 300 
euros per year, 400 euros per year, etc. and if the existing level 
of education were 1 teacher for 1 million people, 2 teachers 
for one million people, etc., and if the average consumption 
of beef were 100g per year, 200g per year, etc. all this would 
give the european collective preferences scheme that could be 
compared to other countries’ preferences schemes.
of different income levels, meaning that the 
regional influence overcomes the average in-
come influence in europe. The regional effect 
can also be highlighted by the comparison be-
tween the eU and asian countries where the 
preference for leisure is lower than would be 
expected for non-asian countries of the same 
income level.
all other things being equal, this implies 
that on average, increased consumption is not 
valued as highly in europe as it is elsewhere, 
which provides another non-mercantilist ex-
planation for the eU’s prudent attitude to-
wards the potential consumption-based gains 
obtained from further liberalisation. 
Food quality
national legislations on food quality give in-
dications of countries’ preferences for quality 
attributes expressed in terms of income. Sev-
eral indicators show that european preferenc-
es for food quality attributes are higher than 
in many countries, but they are also specific. 
european legislation on geographical indica-
tions provides specific protection for product 
origin and production methods. Trademarks 
are not given the same protection. In compari-
son, US legislation provides similar protection 
for trademarks and geographical indications. 
The dispute between the eU and the US over 
eU legislation on geographical indications 
seems to confirm the cliché whereby the euro-
pean vision of quality is linked to the product 
origin and the conservation of traditional pro-
duction methods, etc., whereas the american 
vision is based on innovation, science and the 
composition of products.
The recognition of origin as a quality at-
tribute in the absence of any measurable dif-
ference in the product challenges the non-
discrimination principle based on the like 
product criteria. again, this can also explain 
the eU’s position at the WTo, which more 
readily recognises science-based preferences 
than tradition-based preferences.
Public expenditures
Public expenses are a major source of infor-
mation on countries’ collective preferences for 
different types of public goods and services. 
apart from agriculture and regional develop-
ment, most public expenses are left to national 
sovereignty. efforts to harmonise agricultural 
expenses have shown how difficult it is to ag-
gregate preferences at the regional level as 
soon as public good funding is involved, in 
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Policy implications
spite of relatively similar development levels. 
nevertheless, european national public ex-
penses (as a share of gDP) indicate similari-
ties between european countries, even in non-
agricultural sectors.
We consider the relative income share given 
by each country to any public expense. This 
income share accounts for average collective 
preferences for a public good estimated for a 
given level of all other public goods and in-
come levels.
european countries’ preferences for public 
education over private expenses are relatively 
high, especially for university education and 
public health care, confirming lamy’s state-
ment.
This could imply that for european citizens, 
public contributions to individual needs play 
a part in social welfare. 
Policy implications
The risk of collective preferences being un-
derstood as a new ad hoc tool for protection-
ism in rich countries should not be ignored. 
Whereas we can broadly define protectionism 
as the defence of economic interest groups 
whose contribution to public goods is not 
widely backed by citizens, policies for collec-
tive preferences are aimed 
at fulfilling citizens’ expecta-
tions, including public good 
provision. among these poli-
cies, some can potentially 
have impacts on trade. There-
fore, the risk of misinterpre-
tation is real and must be ad-
dressed here. The following 
proposals are designed to 
minimize the risk of such an 
interpretation, and still sus-
tain the debate on the long-
term architecture of global 
institutions.  
In principle, existing trade 
rules and dispute settlements do not remove 
the possibility for countries to design poli-
cies in favour of their collective preferences 
for public goods and non-market aspects of 
their own living conditions. one should not 
ignore the ability of the dispute settlement 
body (DSb) to take account of the variability 
of these non-market concerns among societies, 
provided they can be assessed. Precedents on 
environment, health, food safety and moral is-
sues show that panels and the appellate body 
already arbitrate between conflicting prefer-
ences by assessing the ‘legitimacy’ of collective 
preferences that have an impact on trade. To 
do so, they assess whether external references 
(international treaties, science-based knowl-
edge, or other government practices) support 
the ‘importance’ of the ‘common interests or 
values’ protected by the policy measure at 
stake.
nevertheless, the WTo judgement of these 
policies imposes a series of conditions that 
question the sustainability of non-measurable 
elements of preferences – like moral values 
– and that increase their cost. Some lawyers 
convincingly argue that dispute precedents, 
such as gambling, are overly restrictive of 
WTo Member States’ sovereignty because of 
the reference to external ‘common interest or 
values’ and the unclear process of ‘weighing 
and balancing’.7 They indeed demonstrate that 
current uncertainty in WTo rulings on these 
two aspects may thwart domestic policies in 
ways that are unpredictable and unwarrant-
ed.8 They further recall that panels and the 
appellate body may not always be infallible, 
so that a collective preference mechanism 
may offer the defendant government a way 
out of its compliance obligation while giving 
the dispute system the opportunity to refine 
and correct the case law.9 These objections are 
motivated by the possible infringement of so-
cial choices by WTo rules. even though they 
do not all refer to collective preferences, they 
do provide support to the initiative. 
Despite these biases, a safeguard for collec-
tive preferences in general would perhaps not 
serve the purpose of ensuring the usefullnes 
of collective preferences in the trade context, 
if these preferences only concern national 
living conditions. We instead suggest the de-
velopment of assessment rules in such a way 
as to account for heterogeneous preferences 
when the assessment of the necessity of the 
policy cannot be established on an interna-
tional basis. a more flexible way of assessing 
the need for the policy would be to compare 
the level of public good achieved by this policy 
with the level achieved by other existing poli-
cies in comparable sectors in this country. For 
instance, in countries where public expenses 
for public health care are high, trade measures 
preventing imports with low sanitary stand-
ards should probably not be looked upon as 
protectionist measures. 
When policy goals concern not only domes-
7 See Marwell (2006)
8 charnovitz (2005)
9 charnovitz (2005)
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tic living conditions, but also global public 
goods or foreign living conditions, the case for 
safeguards is potentially different. as long as 
the consistency between trade rules and mul-
tilateral non-trade rules is not established, col-
lective preferences for non-trade concerns are 
potentially unfulfilled, and this bias is likely to 
become increasingly important in trade nego-
tiations. It is true that trade rules can call upon 
international conventions to rule on a dispute, 
but since the international non-trade rules are 
still barely enforced, the bias in favour of trade 
purposes remains. Therefore, we suggest that a 
new type of safeguard should be negotiated for 
policies based on international conventions, in 
spite of the potential trade effect of these poli-
cies. Processes and production methods, in-
cluding environmental and social criteria, may 
be part of import choices as long as they serve 
multilateral cooperation purposes. While trade 
bans are probably not the best way of enforc-
ing Un conventions, trade policy removal can 
also act as an obstacle to such conventions – 
such as the climate change protocol – in the ab-
sence of the effective implementation of these 
conventions. 
In practical terms, a safeguard for policies 
in favour of multilateral conventions seems 
legitimate, and could potentially accelerate 
the search for better coherence between inter-
national laws. as long as countries using such 
safeguards expect third countries to meet pro-
duction standards that have been agreed upon 
in international conventions, these safeguards 
do not require compensation. If the expected 
standards exceed the level agreed upon in 
these conventions, compensation seems legiti-
mate to help third countries to improve pro-
duction standards. This potentially includes 
the case for minimal labour rights, biodiversity 
protection, resources conservation and climate 
change prevention. The implementation of 
such a safeguard implies increasing the avail-
ability of shared information on countries’ pro-
duction methods and standards. It is indeed 
hardly conceivable that a country would agree 
to finance compensation without a reasonable 
level of confidence in the actual fulfilment of 
its expectations regarding the trading coun-
tries’ standards.
Such improved coherence is of course a long-
term challenge at the multilateral level. In con-
trast, regional agreements are promising fields 
for countries to learn from each other’s prefer-
ences when multi-sector arbitration is neces-
sary. More ambitious conditionality to trade 
preferential agreements can be agreed upon at 
the regional level because a broader range of is-
sues can be negotiated. Furthermore, regional 
and bilateral agreements seem the appropriate 
level at which to test the above compensation. 
Conclusion
european collective preferences appear to 
be in favour of balanced development where 
environmental values and social values play a 
large part in public welfare. europe’s attention 
to its own environmental and social conditions 
is high, and its attention to other countries’ 
environmental and social conditions is also 
increasing. The need for more consumption 
is not perceived in europe as an essential pri-
ority for social welfare, as it is in many coun-
tries, partly because the essential basic needs 
of most people are satisfied, and partly for his-
torical and cultural reasons.  
existing trade rules allow some degree of 
protection of national collective preferences 
for several societal concerns that could be 
threatened by unregulated trade. 
Since the creation of the WTo, countries 
must be accountable for their collective pref-
erences and their policies to implement them. 
Societies’ fears of losing sovereignty over their 
social choices stem partly from this new in-
ternational accountability requirement. Trade 
rules and case law on non-trade concerns and 
exceptions show that provided this effort for 
accountability is made, the DSb tends to allow 
some room for the heterogeneity of collective 
preferences, as far as sanitary and environ-
mental standards are concerned. 
very often, public environmental or sani-
tary policies are implemented because govern-
ments feel they will be socially accepted and 
even desired, without any kind of assessment 
apart from continuous democratic regulation. 
among countries’ perceptions of the need for 
regulations, beliefs, habits and tastes play a ma-
jor role in shaping adequate policies and the 
scientific need is only one determinant. The 
DSb ruling might introduce a long-term bias se-
lection in favour of preferences for measurable 
risks at the expense of subjective elements of 
preferences. In particular, existing trade rules 
do not readily allow the defence of preferences 
for moral values through trade measures (like 
trade bans for unacceptable working or envi-
ronmental conditions in third countries). 
Furthermore, the advance of the enforce-
ment of trade rules over that of non-trade 
rules at the multilateral level creates another 
bias: the multilateral incentives for national 
legislation to be reformed in such a way as to 
conclusion
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increase the availability of material goods and 
the multilateral incentives for them to evolve 
in such a way as to integrate global non-trade 
objectives are unbalanced.   
Therefore, the idea of a new safeguard for 
collective preferences has to be considered 
even if there is a risk of this insightful con-
cept being immediately associated with rich 
countries’ new rhetoric for protectionism. Us-
ing trade to promote environmental and social 
goals in third countries has never met with 
widespread support, either from economists 
or from Southern countries. 
nevertheless, assuming that collective pref-
erences (hence willingness to pay) exist in eu-
rope for raising these standards abroad, and as 
long as the lack of consistency between trade 
laws and non-trade laws on labour and envi-
ronmental standards remains so striking, the 
claim for a temporary safeguard for policies in 
favour of outward-directed preferences seems 
interesting.  The respect of basic human rights 
in foreign countries or heavy local pollution due 
to production methods in foreign countries are 
examples of this kind. If the living conditions 
in third countries expected by the importing 
countries are superior to the minimal stand-
ards agreed upon in international treaties, a 
safeguard would not be legitimate unless com-
pensation is paid by the trade-restricting coun-
try. consequently, international assessments 
of national standards should be registered and 
enforced by an independent body to alleviate 
the bilateral dispute procedures.  
More importantly, as far as preferences for 
global public goods are concerned (climate 
change prevention, ocean pollution, the deple-
tion of global resources, etc.), such a temporary 
safeguard should prevail according to the same 
rules. Temporary import restrictions on coun-
tries that do not respect international agree-
ments on global public goods should be al-
lowed and not compensated, as long as the link 
between the product and the non-respect of 
the global good provision rules is established. 
They would be associated with compensation if 
the standards expected by the trade-restricting 
country were higher than those agreed upon 
in international treaties. compensation would 
then be used to improve these standards.  
as far as collective preferences for local 
public goods are concerned (a society’s collec-
tive preferences for its own living conditions), 
it seems that safeguards are not appropriate. 
The improvement of international recogni-
tion of different assessment methods for non-
measurable aspects of preferences (like beliefs, 
customs, etc.) is probably more promising. an 
international organisation to provide consum-
ers with reliable information about production 
methods would also be of great help. 
For sectors like services, for which the ne-
gotiation process is still at an early stage, the 
effect of trade laws on collective preferences 
will potentially be considerable because to-
day’s heterogeneity in collective preferences is 
reflected by a huge heterogeneity in national 
legalisations. The services sector embodies so-
cieties’ collective preferences for public serv-
ices over private services and the legal duties 
of the latter. european citizens are probably 
not ready to allow access to heath, education, 
energy, water, military security, information 
and transportation to be provided by the inter-
national market, even when these services are 
offered by private operators. negotiations on 
countries’ rights to ensure a certain degree of 
access to these services in a liberalised future 
are perhaps a prerequisite to the gaTS nego-
tiation on private services liberalisation. 
For services, as for all subjective dimensions 
of collective preference, increased flexibility 
in WTo requirements regarding the evalua-
tion of defendant countries’ assessment seems 
necessary in order to integrate multilateral 
non-trade objectives in a more systematic way, 
along with non-scientifically assessable aspects 
of socially desired policies. n
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The question as to whether “collective preferences” of a given WTo member for 
values or principles such as environmental protection, food safety, cultural diver-
sity, the public provision of education and health care, precautions in the field of 
biotechnology or welfare rights, could be jeopardized by the rules of the interna-
tional trading system has taken a high profile in europe during the last years of 
Pascal lamy’s position as eU Dg trade commissioner. Unachieved and criticised for 
its too narrow focus on alleged european concerns, the debate has ever since been 
outpaced by the difficulties to conclude the “Doha Development round” and the need 
widely perceived that conceptual issues and WTo reform options should be debated 
after, and not during, the negotiation process. 
The view of the authors is that the difficulties to conclude successfully a WTo nego-
tiation round highlight the very issue originally raised by the emergence of collective 
preferences in international trade. 
This analysis, which was prepared for the european Parliament (Tender eP/exPol/n/2006/2), 
wraps up the meanings of and rationale for collective preferences policies in the world 
trading system, and their potential implications on trade rules. 
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